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Abstract
We develop a Hotelling model of horizontally and vertically dierentiated brands with mis-
leading advertising competition. We investigate the question of who benets or loses from the
misinformation created by advertising competition and related regulatory policies. We show
that the quality gaps between two brands are crucial for determining the eect of misinfor-
mation on the rms' prots, aggregate or individual consumer surplus, and national welfare.
Although the misinformation tricks consumers into buying products that they would not have
purchased otherwise, it may improve welfare even if the advertising does not expand the overall
demand for the brands. We also show that, although endogenous advertising competition may
lead to a prisoner's dilemma for rms, it makes some consumers better o. We also consider
the eects of several regulatory policies, such as advertising taxes, ad valorem and unit taxes
on production, comprehensive and partial prohibitions of misleading advertising, government
provisions of quality certication or counter-information, and the education of consumers.
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1 Introduction
Should governments regulate misleading advertising? In the classical literature on the economics
of advertising, an advertisement that misleads and fools consumers is known as persuasive adver-
tising, which is usually considered to be potentially anti-competitive.1 Many developed countries
have government agencies (such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)) that regulate misleading or false advertising and encourage the provi-
sion of accurate information to allow consumers to make informed choices. However, Glaeser and
Ujhelyi (2010) suggest that a certain amount of misinformation may improve social welfare if a
product market is imperfectly competitive. The result comes from the fact that misinformation
mitigates the problem of under-consumption of products that results from imperfect competition
although it leads consumers to buy products that they would not have purchased otherwise and
lowers consumer surplus. In other words, misinformation may improve social welfare by harming
consumers on the condition that it induces an overall increase in market demand. Therefore,
government regulation and intervention are benecial to consumers but may be harmful to rms
and overall social welfare.
This article investigates misleading advertising competition among brands in a Hotelling
model where advertising induces a shift between two brands without expanding the total demand.
We consider a situation where two horizontally and vertically dierentiated brands compete in
price and advertising to take market share from each other. The price and advertising decisions
are made strategically by each brand, and the advertising contains misinformation about brand
quality, which does not enhance the utility of using the brands but only provides a veneer of
quality.
Within the above framework, we address the question of who benets or loses from misleading
advertising competition between two brands and from related regulations. We rst show that
a certain amount of misinformation may improve social welfare by removing ineciency due
to a misallocation of the products even if the misinformation does not induce an expansion of
total demand for the brands. Interestingly, the misinformation actually makes some consumers
1For a comprehensive survey of the economic analyses of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
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better o because of the eect that misinformation has on price changes. We also show that the
quality gaps between two brands play a crucial role in determining the eect of misinformation on
rms' prots, aggregate and individual consumer surpluses, and welfare. Second, the amount of
misinformation endogenously given by misleading advertising competition is shown to be excessive
from a welfare perspective. If there are no quality gaps between the brands, the advertising
competition harms both rms but does not aect the consumers. In this case, no one benets
from the advertising competition. This situation is equivalent to a prisoner's dilemma: each
rm individually prefers to send misinformation in order to take market share from its rival, but
the industry is collectively worse o if both rms do so. However, if the quality gaps are large,
advertising competition increases not only a high-quality rm's prots but also the utility of the
consumers who prefer the low-quality brand because of the price-change eects of misinformation.
We also investigate the eects of several regulatory policies, such as advertising taxes, unit and
ad valorem taxes on production, comprehensive and partial regulations for misleading advertising,
and government provisions of information about brand qualities. Both advertising and ad valorem
taxes alleviate the advertising competition between the two brands and improve social welfare.
However, the impact of advertising competition on consumers and rms under the two forms of
taxation dier. If quality gaps are small, imposing a small advertising (ad valorem) tax on rms
increases (decreases) both rms' prots. Conversely, if quality gaps are large, an advertising (ad
valorem) tax decreases (increases) the prots of high-quality (low-quality) rms. Consumers are
more likely to be better o under the advertising tax than under the ad valorem tax. Interestingly,
imposing an advertising tax increases both rms' prots and consumer welfare.
Next, we examine the government's incentives to employ a partial or selective regulation on
misleading advertising. If misinformation has dierent eects on consumers and rms, a policy-
maker who places dierent weights on industry prots and consumer welfare may employ dierent
types of arbitrary regulation against each rm's misinformation. We show that a policymaker who
weights the consumers' (industry's) benets more heavily may have an incentive to only prohibit
misinformation concerning the high-quality (low-quality) brand. This result occurs because the
prohibition of misinformation concerning the high-quality brand lowers (raises) the price of the
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more (less) heavily consumed brand. We also investigate the government's incentives to provide
information about product quality in response to the rms' misinformation. We show that the
government's decision to negate or conrm the rms' misinformation depends on the government's
bias: a consumerist policymaker may conrm misinformation about the low-quality brand and
negate misinformation about the high-quality brand, whereas a neutralist policymaker may do
the opposite. These results can be explained by examining the two eects of misinformation: the
mischoice and price-change eects.
Finally, we extend the basic model by considering heterogeneous consumers (i.e., nave and
smart consumers) and investigate how misleading advertising competition aects equilibrium out-
comes. Advertising competition necessarily reduces the utility of nave consumers, but it may
improve, on average, the utility of smart consumers. We also show that if the quality gaps be-
tween the two brands are small, a small decrease in the proportion of nave consumers will increase
both rms' prots, aggregate consumer surplus, and welfare because this decrease weakens the
incentives to engage in unprotable advertising competition. Therefore, in this case, a government
policy of educating consumers works well.
The welfare eects of advertising and optimal regulatory policies have been extensively studied
by Nelson (1974), Dixit and Norman (1978), Becker and Murphy (1993), Glaeser and Ujhelyi
(2010), Hattori and Higashida (2012), and many others. As mentioned above, Glaeser and Ujhelyi
(2010) shows that misinformation provided by persuasive or misleading advertising may improve
social welfare if a product market is imperfectly competitive. Although our study shares some
common features with Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), our study diers in several respects. First,
we consider a Hotelling model with a horizontally and vertically dierentiated product market,
whereas their study considers a Cournot model with a homogenous goods market.2 Second, in
their study, advertising induces an overall increase in market demand and thus increases the total
consumption of the products, whereas in our study, advertising induces a demand shift between
the brands in stead of an expansion of total demand.3 These two dierences are important because
2For the welfare eects of misleading advertising and the minimum quality standards in a model of vertical
product dierentiation, see Hattori and Higashida (2011).
3In other words, advertising is a public good among rms in Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), whereas advertising is
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our result, which shows that misinformation may improve welfare, depends on the quality gaps
between the brands. In addition, our result holds even if the misinformation does not increase
the total consumption of the brands. Third, our study investigates the strategic interactions
between the rms and the government in the transmission of (mis)information, whereas their
study treats the government advertising as exogenous. Finally and most importantly, our study
considers consumers to be heterogeneous, not only with respect to their tastes (i.e., the location
on the Hotelling line) but also in their knowledge of the quality of products (i.e., either smart
or nave consumers). Hence, we can determine what types of consumers benet or suer from
misinformation and related regulations.
Using a Hotelling model of horizontal product dierentiation, Bloch and Manceau (1999)
investigate the eect of persuasive advertising on the protability of rms. They show that in
the duopoly case, advertising may induce a decrease in the price of the advertised product if
the advertising changes the distribution of consumer tastes between products. However, because
their study focuses on the protability of exogenously given advertising for rms, they do not
consider the welfare eects of advertising or endogenous advertising competition. Furthermore,
their study does not account for vertical product dierentiation or quality dierentials between the
brands. In contrast, our study considers the welfare eects of persuasive (misleading) advertising
and endogenous advertising competition in a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product
dierentiation.4
To focus on the welfare and distributional eects of regulations, we do not consider the
quality-guarantee eects of advertising, such as the eects of advertising on brands' reputations.
In addition, we exclude the signaling-eciency eect of advertising from our analysis.5 Following
Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), we assume that all consumers are nave in the sense that when
purchasing products, they always believe the misinformation provided by rms. However, the
a private good for each rm in our study.
4See Chakrabarti and Haller (2011) for a study of comparative advertising competition among oligopolists.
See Hattori and Higashida (2012) for a study of generic advertising in a duopoly model with horizontal product
dierentiation and advertising spillovers.
5For the quality-guarantee and the signaling-eciency eects of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
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assumption is relaxed in Section 4 when we consider the existence of smart consumers who are
never misled by the misinformation and who can identify the true qualities of products when
making purchase.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic theoretical model and
investigate the eect of exogenous changes in misinformation. We then derive the equilibrium
of the endogenous advertising competition and the second-best optimum. Section 3 examines
several regulatory policies, such as advertising and ad valorem taxes, comprehensive and par-
tial regulations, and government advertising. Government biases toward consumers' benets are
also considered in Section 3. Section 4 extends the basic model by incorporating heterogeneous
consumers and investigates a policy for educating consumers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Suppose that a continuum of consumers is distributed uniformly on a \Hotelling" line segment
[0; 1] with mass 1. The location of an arbitrary consumer x 2 [0; 1] is associated with his/her
preferences. There are two rms indexed by i = 1; 2 in this market. The rms are located at
either end of the unit interval, reecting horizontal product dierentiation. Each rm i sells a
Brand i at a uniform price pi.6 The \perceived" utility of each consumer indexed by x is dened
by
U(x) =
8><>: (v1 + s1)  p1   tx if buys Brand 1(v2 + s2)  p2   t (1  x) if buys Brand 2 (1)
where vi is the true quality of Brand i (or the true benets that consumers derive from consuming
Brand i), si is the misinformation about Brand i's quality, and tx and t(1   x) are the costs of
buying a brand dierent from the consumer ’s ideal choice.7 Each consumer buys only one unit
6Our model setting is similar to that of von der Fehr and Stevik (1998), who suggest a Hotelling framework for
persuasive advertising. However, their study focuses on the equilibrium level of advertising, and they investigate
neither the welfare implications of persuasive advertising nor the eect of regulatory policies. For a study of
informative advertising that uses a Hotelling model, see Tirole (1988).
7Because we are not interested in the rms' choice of product dierentiation (location), we assume that the
transportation costs are linear.
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of the brand. When making a purchase, consumers cannot identify the true quality of the brand
(vi). Rather, they only know the perceived quality of those ((vi+si)).8 Thus, the utility expressed
by (1) is called \perceived" utility. However, the true or ex-post utility is given by
~U(x) =
8><>: v1   p1   tx if buys Brand 1v2   p2   t (1  x) if buys Brand 2: (2)
We assume that vi (or vi+si) is suciently large for both Brands i = 1; 2 such that all consumers
buy either of the brands in equilibrium (i.e., the market is fully covered). Let x^ denote the
marginal consumer who is indierent between purchasing Brands 1 and 2. Then we have
x^ =
(v1 + s1)  (v2 + s2)  (p1   p2)
2t
+
1
2
:
The prot functions of rm i are given by
i = (pi   ci) yi   C(si) (3)
where y1 = x^ and y2 = (1  x^) are the outputs of rms 1 and 2, respectively; ci is the constant
marginal cost of production; and C(si) is the advertising cost for rm i, where we assume C 0 > 0
and C 00  0. For the sake of simplicity, the advertising costs are specied by C(si) = k s2i , where
k > 0 represents the cost parameter of misleading advertising. We assume that each rm faces
the same advertising cost structure. For example, both rms face the same price of advertising
set by the ad agencies.
The timing of events is as follows. In the rst stage, each rm chooses on the amount of
misleading advertising needed to deceive and persuade consumers to buy more. In the second
stage, each rm decides the price of its own brand. Therefore, this advertising can be considered
strategic advertising in the sense that rms project their advertising strategies while accounting
for how advertising aects future price competition.9
8Following Nelson’s (1970) terms, this article assumes that misleading advertising increases the search qualities
of the advertised goods but does not aect their experience qualities.
9Notice that a situation where advertising and pricing decisions are made simultaneously by the rms (i.e., non-
strategic advertising) does not qualitatively aect the results. The amount of advertising in the case of non-strategic
advertising is shown to be greater than that obtained in the case of strategic advertising.
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We solve for a subgame-perfect equilibrium by applying backward induction. Solving for the
Nash equilibrium prices and quantities in the second stage yields:
pi (si; sj) =
(i   j) + (si   sj)
3
+ ci + t; yi (si; sj) =
(i   j) + (si   sj)
6t
+
1
2
: (4)
where i  (vi   ci) represents the quality minus cost parameter of Brand i. We hereafter refer
to i simply as the quality parameter of Brand i. Without loss of generality, we assume 1  2
throughout the article. Hence, we call Firm 1 (Firm 2) and Brand 1 (Brand 2) the high-quality
(low-quality) rm and the high-quality (low-quality) brand, respectively. We nd from (4) that
@pi =@si > 0, @p

i =@sj < 0, @y

i =@si > 0, and @y

i =@sj < 0: misinformation raises own price and
output but lowers those of the rival. Substituting (4) into (3) yields equilibrium prots at the
second stage, as i (si; sj). Aggregate consumer surplus at the second-stage equilibrium is dened
by
CS(si; sj) =
Z 1
x=0
~U(x) =
Z x^
0
[v1   tx  p1] dx+
Z 1
x^
[v2   t (1  x)  p2] dx;
where x^ = y1. Notice that CS is evaluated using the true quality of the brand vi instead of
(vi + si), which means that misleading advertising aects consumers' utility by inducing changes
in their purchasing decisions (x^) and aecting the prices of the brands (p1 and p2). The welfare
at the second-stage equilibrium is dened by W (si; sj)  CS +
P
i 

i .
In this section, to ensure that interior solutions are obtained for yi and si, we assume the
following.
Assumption 1. For all i > 0, it holds that 0  (1   2)   
9kt  1
3k
.
 The case of no misinformation (Case O). Here we derive the equilibrium outcomes in
a case with no advertising competition and no misinformation (i.e., si = 0 for all i = 1; 2) as a
benchmark. We can interpret this case as one in which the government can completely prohibit
both rms from producing misleading advertising. The equilibrium outcomes in this case are
8
obtained by substituting si = 0 into the second-stage equilibrium outcome as follows.
pOi =
i   j
3
+ ci + t; yOi = x^
O =
i   j
6t
+
1
2
; Oi =
(3t+ i   j)2
18t
;
CSO =
(1   2)2
36t
+
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t; O = t+
(1   2)2
9t
;
WO =
5(1   2)2
36t
+
1 + 2
2
  1
4
t;
where the superscript O indicates the equilibrium variable in the case with no misinformation.
From Assumption 1, we know that ji  j j < 3t, which ensures an interior solution of yOi 2 [0; 1],
8i = 1; 2. For example, if 1 > 2, we obtain pO1 > pO2 , yO1 > yO2 , and O1 > O2 . In addition, CSO,
O, and WO are increasing functions of the quality gaps between the brands.
 Exogenous changes in misinformation. Before investigating the endogenous advertising
competition between the rms, we examine the eect of exogenous misinformation on the second-
stage equilibrium outcomes. Dierentiating i and 

j in si, we have
di
dsi
= (pi   ci)

@yi
@pj
@pj
@si
+
@yi
@si

  C 0(si);
dj
dsi
=
 
pj   cj
@yj
@pi
@pi
@si
+
@yj
@si

;
where 
@yi
@pj
@pj
@si
+
@yi
@si

=
1
3t
> 0;

@yj
@pi
@pi
@si
+
@yj
@si

=   1
3t
< 0:
Therefore, we nd that misinformation about Brand i always increases the revenue of rm i and
decreases the prots of rm j.
Using the Leibniz' Rule, we can divide the eect of a change in si on consumer surplus CS
into two components:
dCS
ds1
=
dx^
ds1
h
fv1   tx^   p1g   fv2   t (1  x^)  p2g
i
| {z }
mischoice eect
+
(Z x^
0

 @p

1
@s1

dx+
Z 1
x^

 @p

2
@s1

dx
)
| {z }
price change eects
=  s1   s2
6t
+

 3t+ (s1   s2) + (1   2)
18t| {z }
( ) from raises in p1
+
3t  (s1   s2)  (1   2)
18t| {z }
(+) from falls in p2

:
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##### FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE #####
The rst term represents the mischoice eect of misinformation. This eect is due to the change
in purchasing behavior, which is induced by misinformation. Because the marginal consumer is
given by equating f(v1 + s1)   tx^   p1g to f(v2 + s2)   t(1   x^)   p2g, the mischoice eect
becomes non-zero unless s1 = s2. Notice that this eect decreases as the dierence in the amount
of misinformation between Brands 1 and 2 decreases. In addition, if sj = 0, any exogenous
changes in Brand i's misinformation away from zero (in either a positive or negative direction)
will reduce consumer surplus through the mischoice eect. The second term represents the price-
change eect: a change in utility due to the two brands' price changes, which are induced by
misinformation. Notice that the price-change eect of increasing s1 is positive for the consumers
who bought Brand 2 and negative for the consumers who bought Brand 1 when evaluated at
s1 = s2 = 0.
Finally, we obtain the eect of a change in si on W  as follows.
dW 
dsi
=
 (si   sj) + 2(i   j)
18t
  C 0(si); (5)
where the second-term is the direct cost eect of misinformation. The above equation implies
that a small increase in misinformation about the high-quality brand may improve welfare when
evaluated at si = sj .
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the eect of positive or negative misinformation concerning
the brands on the equilibrium outcomes in four cases. In all four cases, the marginal production
cost for both rms is assumed to be zero. Hence, the quality gaps are represented simply by the
dierences in v. The upper-left panel (a) of the gure illustrates the case in which there are no
quality gaps between the brands (i.e., 1 = 2) and there is positive misinformation about Brand
1. If there is no misinformation, consumers can make their purchasing decisions based on the
true quality v1 and v2, and rms 1 and 2 charge pO1 and p
O
2 , respectively. Obviously, market
share is divided equally between the rms (i.e., the marginal consumer is x^O = 1=2). An increase
in positive misinformation about Brand 1 raises the perceived quality of the brand (from v1 to
v+1 ), which raises the price of Brand 1 (from p
O
1 to p
+
1 ), lowers that of Brand 2 (from p
O
2 to p
+
2 ),
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and moves the marginal consumer to the right (from x^O to x^+). The change in Firm 1's prots
is represented by areas B + C + E, the change in Firm 2's prots is represented by  D   E,
and the change in industry prots is represented by B + C   D. The mendacious rm gains,
and the truthful rm loses. Because the ex-post consumer surplus should be evaluated using
the true qualities (v1 instead of v+1 ), compared with Case O, the consumers located at [0; x^
O]
suer a loss resulting from the price increase equal to area B, whereas the consumers located at
[x^; 1] gain from the price decrease equal to area D. These two eects approximately represent
the price-change eect of misinformation dened above. In other words, among those who did
not change their purchasing decisions, the consumers who bought from the mendacious rm lose,
and those who bought from the truthful rm gain. In addition, the consumers located at [x^O; x^]
incorrectly changed their purchasing decisions, and the change in their utility is  A   C, which
approximately represents the mischoice eect. In other words, the consumers who were misled
on their purchasing decisions lose. As a result, the consumers are made worse o overall by the
misinformation. The total change in aggregate consumer surplus is  A  C  B +D. Welfare is
reduced by (B +C +D) + ( A C  B +D) = A plus the cost of providing the misinformation.
Through similar inferences, we nd that any unilateral increase (either positive or negative) in
misinformation will generate a social loss in a case with equal-quality parameters.
However, misinformation does not necessarily reduce welfare. The upper-right panel (b) of
Figure 1 illustrates this situation. If there is no misinformation, the equilibrium is characterized
by pO1 , p
O
2 , and x^
O. An increase in positive misinformation about the high-quality brand (Brand
1) changes the equilibrium to p+1 , p
+
2 , and x^
+. The industry prots (i.e., the sum of both rms'
prots) increase by B + C   D. Aggregate consumer surplus is changed by  B + D because
of the price-change eect, by A   C because of the mischoice eect, and by A   B   C + D
overall.10 Therefore, welfare is imcreased by (B +C  D) + (A B  C +D) = A. If the welfare
gain from misinformation represented by A outweighs the cost of sending the misinformation, the
10In this case, an increase in the misinformation about the high-quality brand decreases consumer surplus. In
particular, from CS(s1; 0)   CSO =  s1 f5s1 + 4 (1   2)g =(36t), we nd that an exogenous change in the
misinformation about the high-quality brand increases consumer surplus as long as  4(1   2)=5 < s1 < 0.
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misinformation will improve net social welfare, as shown in (5).
Conversely, as the lower-left panel (c) of Figure 1 indicates, positive misinformation about
the low-quality brand necessarily generates social loss, represented by A. In this case, consumer
surplus may be increased by the misinformation (the area ( A+B+C D)), whereas the industry
prots are necessarily reduced.11
The lower-right panel (d) of Figure 1 illustrates the eect of negative misinformation concern-
ing the low-quality brand in the case of 1 > 2. The example of providing negative misinformation
is the health and safety alert for some products that is sometimes excessively provided by gov-
ernment or some third parties. The negative misinformation about Brand 2 lowers the perceived
quality of the brand (from v2 to v 2 ), which lowers p2 to p
 
2 , raises p1 to p
 
1 , and moves the
marginal consumer to the right (from x^O to x^ ). The change in industry prots is represented
by B + C  D, and the change in consumer surplus is represented by A  B   C +D (the price
change eect is represented by  B+D, and the mischoice eect is represented by A C). There-
fore, sending negative misinformation about the low-quality brand may improve social welfare, as
shown in (5).
 Endogenous misinformation through advertising competition (Case S). Now we
consider the endogenous transmission of misinformation by the rms and derive the equilibrium
in the rst stage. In the rst stage, each rm simultaneously chooses an amount of mislead-
ing advertising. The rst-order condition for prot maximization yields the following reaction
function:
si = Ri(sj)  3t+ i   j18kt  1  
1
18kt  1sj : (6)
From Assumption 1, we know that (9kt   1)  0, which ensures the second-order conditions
for an interior solutions and the stability condition of Nash equilibrium hold. We nd that the
advertising choices are strategic substitutes (i.e., the reaction functions have negative slope).
11In particular, from CS(0; s2)   CSO = s2 f4(1   2)  5s2g =(36t), we nd that an exogenous change in the
misinformation about the low-quality brand increases consumer surplus as long as 0 < s2 < 4(1   2)=5.
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The equilibrium amount of misinformation can be derived by solving (6) for i = 1; 2:
sSi =
i   j
2 (9kt  1) +
1
6k
 0; (7)
where the superscript S indicates a variable in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the \strategic
advertising" case. From (7), we nd sS1   sS2 = (1   2)= (9kt  1)  0: Firm 1 (the high-quality
rm) engages in more misleading advertising than Firm 2 (the low-quality rm). We also nd
that dsS1 =dt  0 and dsS2 =dt  0, which means that the more dierentiated the brands are, the less
(more) misinformation about the high-quality (low-quality) brand will be sent. This result occurs
because an increase in t relaxes the price competition between the rms and raises the prices of
both brands. However, when the misinformation about both brands are xed, an increase in t
decreases the market share of the high-quality brand but increases the market share of the low-
quality brand. Therefore, an increase in t decreases (increases) the marginal benets of sending
misinformation for the high-quality (low-quality) rm.
Substituting sSi into the second-stage equilibrium outcome, we have
pSi =
3kt (i   j)
(9kt  1) + ci + t; y
S
i =
3k (i   j)
2 (9kt  1) +
1
2
; (8)
Si =
(18kt  1) [(9kt  1) + 3k (i   j)]2
36k (9kt  1)2 ; (9)
S =
k (18kt  1)
2 (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2 + t  1
18k
; (10)
CSS =
3k (3kt  2)
4 (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2 +
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t; (11)
WS =
k(45kt  8)
4(9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2 +
1 + 2
2
  1
18k
  1
4
t: (12)
Assumption 1 ensures that the equilibrium outputs of both rms are positive (i.e., ySi > 0; 1
holds for both rms in equilibrium). We nd from (10) that an increase in the quality gaps
between the brands always increases the industry prots. This nding is consistent with the
case of no misinformation. However, an increase in the quality gaps (with the average remaining
constant) decreases consumer surplus and welfare if k and/or t are small enough that 3kt < 2 and
45kt < 8, respectively. This nding contrasts sharply with the case of no misinformation, where
the quality gap increases consumer surplus and welfare (see CSO and WO in Section 2.1). In the
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case of advertising competition, the quality gap makes the advertising competition more severe,
especially if k and/or t are smaller. Therefore, consumer surplus and welfare decrease because of
the increased amount of misinformation.
In the following, we compare the outcomes in case O with those in case S. First, comparing
the equilibrium prices and outputs yields
pSi   pOi =
i   j
3 (9kt  1) ; y
S
i   yOi =
i   j
6t (9kt  1) : (13)
If 1 = 2, the equilibrium prices and outputs are identical in the two cases. If 1 > 2, advertis-
ing competition lowers (increases) the price of the low-quality (high-quality) brand and shrinks
(expands) the market share of the low-quality (high-quality) brand.
Second, we compare the equilibrium prots in the two cases:
S1   O1 =  
1
36k
+
1
6 (9kt  1)(1   2) +
27kt  2
36t (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2; (14)
S2   O2 =  
1
36k
  1
6 (9kt  1)(1   2) +
27kt  2
36t (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2  0; (15)
S  O =   1
18k
+
27kt  2
18t (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2: (16)
We can easily nd that if 1 = 2, then advertising competition is harmful to both rms. Although
the rms pay advertising costs, they both gain nothing. The situation is equivalent to a prisoner's
dilemma: each rm individually prefers to send misinformation to capture market share from
its rival, but the industry is collectively worse o if both rms do so.12 However, if the quality
gaps are large, advertising competition may render the high-quality rm (Firm 1) better o,
whereas the low-quality rm (Firm 2) necessarily becomes worse o. This result occurs because
advertising competition increases Firm 1's revenues (from (13)) and its advertising costs. In
12In his seminal work, Pigou (1932, part 2, chapter 9) pointed out the prisoners' dilemma-like situation of
advertising competition by noting, \Secondly, it may happen that the expenditures on advertisement made by
competing monopolists will simply neutralise one another, and leave the industrial position exactly as it would have
been if neither had expended anything. For, clearly, if each of two rivals makes equal eorts to attract the favour
of the public away from the other, the total result is the same as it would have been if neither had made any eort
at all."
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contrast, advertising competition decreases Firm 2's revenues but increases its advertising costs.13
In addition, S is larger (smaller) than O if the quality gaps between the brands are larger
(smaller) because the smaller the gaps between the brands are, the more likely that the advertising
competition becomes wasteful for both rms.14
Third, comparing CSS and CSO, we have
CSS   CSO =  (36kt+ 1) (1   2)
2
36t (9kt  1)2  0: (17)
If 1 = 2, neither individual nor aggregate consumer surplus is aected by advertising com-
petition. In contrast, if 1 6= 2, advertising competition decreases aggregate consumer surplus
because it leads consumers to make the wrong brand choice and raises the price of the more con-
sumed brand (Brand 1), although it also lowers the price of the less consumed brand (Brand 2).
The greater the dierence between 1 and 2 is, more advertising competition reduces aggregate
consumer surplus. However, as a result of advertising competition, the consumers who bought
the high-quality brand are worse o, and those who bought the low-quality brand are better o.
Finally, we compare social welfare in the two cases:
WS  WO =   1
18k
+
18kt  5
36t (9kt  1)2 (1   2)
2 < 0; (18)
where the sign condition is from Assumption 1.15 Therefore, we nd that advertising competition
always reduces social welfare.
If there are no quality gaps between the brands (1 = 2), advertising competition decreases
the prots of both rms, has no eect on consumer surplus, and thus reduces social welfare. In
13In detail, S1 > 
O
1 holds if
(1   2) >
(9kt  1)
hp
9k2t2 + kt(27kt 2)  3kt
i
k (27kt  2) :
14In detail, S < O holds when
(1   2)2 < t(9kt  1)
2
k(27kt  2) <
2:
15Substituting  in Assumption 1 into (1   2) in (18), we have
(WS  WO)

(1 2)<
< (WS  WO)

(1 2)=
=   5
324k2t
< 0:
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##### FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE #####
this case, no one benets from advertising competition. Government regulations for prohibiting
misleading advertising will be Pareto-improving. If 1 > 2, the consumers located at [x^S ; 1]
will benet from advertising competition, those located at [0; x^S ] and the low-quality rm will
suer, and the high-quality rm may benet. However, also in this case, advertising competition
necessarily reduces welfare due to the socially inecient duplication of the advertising costs.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison between the two equilibria. Panels (a) and (b) of the
gure illustrate the cases of equal and unequal quality between the brands, respectively. We can
see from the left panel that advertising competition between rms of equal quality does not aect
equilibrium prices, market shares, or aggregate and individual consumer surpluses. Notice that
the rms obtain nothing from advertising competition and simply bear the burden of advertising
costs. Thus, the welfare is reduced by exactly the same amount as the costs.
In the right panel (b), both rms send positive misinformation about their own brands,
but the high-quality rm (Firm 1) provides a greater amount of misinformation than the low-
quality rm (Firm 2). Therefore, the price of the high-quality (low-quality) brand is increased
(decreased) by advertising competition. In this case, the welfare gain is represented by the shaded
area. However, the welfare gain is necessarily dominated by the two rms' total advertising costs,
and the welfare under advertising competition is necessarily smaller than it would be in the case
of no misinformation.
 The second-best amount of misinformation. Here we derive the socially optimal
(second-best) amount of misinformation given the duopoly market structure. The second-best
amount of advertising, denoted as sSB1 and s
SB
2 , can be derived by solving the following problem:
maxs1; s2 W
. Then we have
sSBi =
i   j
18kt+ 1
: (19)
We nd that the second-best amount of misinformation concerning the high-quality (low-quality)
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brand is positive (negative) if 1 6= 2, but is zero if 1 = 2.16
Comparing (19) with (7) and using Assumption 1, we have
sS1   sSB1 =
3 (1   2)
2(9kt  1)(18kt+ 1) +
1
6k
> 0;
sS2   sSB2 =  
3 (1   2)
2(9kt  1)(18kt+ 1) +
1
6k
> 0;
which implies that both brands send an excessive amount of misinformation through advertising
competition.
Figure 3 illustrates the second-best amount of misinformation in the case of 1 > 2. The
combination of positive misinformation for the high-quality brand and negative misinformation for
the low-quality brand is desirable from the welfare point of view because the higher-quality brand
would be promoted to consumers. Intrinsically, the marginal consumer between the two brands
should be located at point E (i.e., x^E = ft+ (1   2)g =(2t)) where the v1  tx and v2  t(1  x)
curves intersect, to obtain the maximum welfare gain. However, without any misinformation, the
marginal consumer would be x^O because of the higher price of the high-quality brand. Providing
the amount of optimal misinformation reduces the distortion by moving the marginal consumer
toward point E at the minimum costs of providing misinformation.17 We should also note that
providing optimal amount of misinformation necessarily decreases aggregate consumer surplus
because the price-change eect of the misinformation is necessarily negative.
Our results show that an appropriate amount of misinformation would improve social wel-
fare. These ndings are closely related to the results obtained by Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), who
shows that if a product market is imperfectly competitive, a certain amount of misinformation
may increase consumption and improve social welfare. In contrast, our results show that a certain
16The second-order conditions are
@2W 
@s2i
=  2k   1
18k
< 0;

@2W 
@s21
 @
2W 
@s22

 

@2W 
@si@sj
2
=
2k (18kt+ 1)
9t
> 0:
17Because of our assumption of symmetric and increasing cost structure for sending misinformation, the amount
of optimal misinformation is the same in absolute value fro the high- and low-quality brands.
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amount of misinformation may improve social welfare even if it only shifts demand and does not in-
crease the total amount of consumption: the misinformation improves social welfare by alleviating
misallocation between high-quality and low-quality brands.18 In addition, the eect of misinfor-
mation on consumers is uniform among the consumers in Galeser and Ujhelyi (2010), whereas in
our study, the eect diers across consumers: some consumers gain from misinformation, whereas
others do not.
3 Regulatory Policies
In this section, we investigate several regulatory policies: an advertising tax, ad an valorem tax,
comprehensive and partial regulations on misleading advertising, and government provisions of
quality certication or counter-information.
 Advertising taxes. Here we investigate the eect of introducing a small advertising tax on
rms' prots, consumer surplus, and welfare.19 Suppose that the government taxes the advertising
expenditures of the rms as follows: i = (pi   ci)yi   (1 + a)C(si), where a is the tax on each
rm's advertising expenditures. Welfare is dened as W = CS ++ a
P
C(si), where the third
term is tax revenue.
The equilibrium amount of misinformation under advertising competition is derived by
sai =
3k f3t+ (i   j)g (1 + a)  1
6k(1 + a) f9kt(1 + a)  1g ;
where superscript a indicates a variable in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of advertising com-
18In other words, misinformation may improve welfare by alleviating the ineciencies from under-consumption
of the high-quality brand and over-consumption of the low-quality brand in our study, whereas misinformation may
improve welfare by alleviating the ineciency from under-consumption of the total consumption in Glaeser and
Ujhelyi (2010).
19In many European countries, the government imposes a tax on various kinds of advertising. For example, the
Swedish government levies a tax on advertising in daily newspapers and other printed media. The Greek government
levies on a tax on television advertising. In addition, advertising is taxed in some form in Austria, Belgium, France,
the Netherlands, and Spain.
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petition with an advertising tax. Then we have
dsa1
da

a=0
=   1
6k
  9kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) < 0; (20)
dsa2
da

a=0
=   1
6k
+
9kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) R 0 , (1   2) R

9kt  1
9kt

; (21)
which implies that a small increase in the advertising tax reduces (raises) the amount of misinfor-
mation about the low-quality brand if the quality gaps are small (large), whereas the tax always
reduces the amount of misinformation about the high-quality brand. The advertising expendi-
tures of the high-quality rm are larger than those of the low-quality rm. Thus, the advertising
tax has a more negative impact on the high-quality rm's incentives to advertise than on the
low-quality rm's incentives to advertise.
Hence, we have the following comparative static results.
da1
da

a=0
=
1
36k
  3kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) 
k(27kt  1)
4(9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2 R 0
, (1   2) Q

9kt  1
27kt  1


da2
da

a=0
=
1
36k
  3kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) 
k(27kt  1)
4(9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2 > 0;
dCSa
da

a=0
=
3k (6kt+ 1)
2 (9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2  0;
dW a
da

a=0
=
1
9k
+
3k
2(9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2 > 0:
The derivations are presented in the Appendix.
If 1 = 2, a small increase in the advertising tax benets both rms because it reduces
unprotable advertising competition and does not aect the aggregate and individual consumer
surpluses. Therefore, in this case, the introduction of an advertising tax is Pareto-improving
in a strict sense. However, if the quality gap is substantial, a small increase in the advertising
tax benets the low-quality rm (Firm 2) but may harm the high-quality rm (Firm 1). This
result occurs because the advertising tax greatly diminishes the advantages (disadvantages) of
advertising competition for the high-quality (low-quality) rm if the quality gaps between the
brands are large. The aggregate consumer surplus is necessarily enhanced by a small increase in
the advertising tax, but the individual consumer surplus is not. Because the advertising tax raises
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the price of the low-quality brand, the consumers who prefer the low-quality brand will be made
worse o by the tax. However, an advertising tax improves welfare irrespective of the quality
gaps.
 Ad valorem taxes. We now consider an ad valorem tax on the outputs. The model setup
is the same as the setup in the basic model except for the prots of the rms and the denition of
welfare. Firm i's prots are given by  = f(1  p)pi   cg yi C(si), where p is the ad valorem tax
rate. In this subsection, we temporarily assume c1 = c2 = c for derivational simplicity. Welfare is
given by W = CS ++ p
P
piyi, where the third term is tax revenue.
The equilibrium amount of misinformation under advertising competition is derived as
s
p
i =
(1  p) f3k (3t+ (i   j))  (1  p)g
6k(9kt  1 + p) ;
where the superscript p indicates a variable in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the advertising
competition with an ad valorem tax. Thus, we have
ds
p
1
dp

p=0
=   1
6k
  9kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) < 0; (22)
ds
p
2
dp

p=0
=   1
6k
+
9kt
2(9kt  1)2 (1   2) R 0 , (1   2) R

9kt  1
9kt

; (23)
which implies that a small increase in the ad valorem tax reduces (raises) the amount of misinfor-
mation about the low-quality brand if the quality gaps are small (large). However, a small increase
in the ad valorem tax always reduces the amount of misinformation about the high-quality brand.
Because the quality gaps 1 > 2 means that p1 > p2 holds in the second stage, Firm 1's incentive
to send misinformation is weakened to a greater extent by the ad valorem tax than Firm 2's
incentive. Because the amounts of misinformation are strategic substitutes, the decrease in Firm
1's misinformation increases Firm 2's misinformation. Notice that (22) and (23) are identical with
(20) and (21): a small increase in the ad valorem tax and that in the advertising tax have the
same impact on advertising competition.
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Thus, we have the following comparative static results.
d
p
1
dp

p=0
=  9kt  1
18k
  (9kt  1)
2 + 81k2t2
6(9kt  1)2 (1   2) 
81k3t2
2( 1 + 9kt)3 (1   2)
2 < 0;
d
p
2
dp

p=0
=  9kt  1
18k
+
(9kt  1)2 + 81k2t2
6(9kt  1)2 (1   2) 
81k3t2
2( 1 + 9kt)3 (1   2)
2 R 0
, (1   2) R

9kt  1
9kt
2

dCSp
dp

p=0
=  c+ 3k(6kt+ 1)
2(9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2 R 0;
dW p
dp

p=0
=
1
9k
+
3k
2(9kt  1)3 (1   2)
2 > 0:
The derivations are presented in the Appendix.
In the case of no misinformation (s1 = s2 = 0), imposing a small ad valorem tax on the two
brands does not aect the equilibrium market shares or social welfare because the tax revenues
simply constitute a transfer from the rms and consumers to the government. However, the
presence of advertising competition changes the situation considerably. If 1 = 2, a small increase
in the ad valorem tax harms both rms because their revenues are decreased although it also
reduces an unprotable advertising competition. The tax may harm consumers because the rms
include the tax in their prices, but it necessarily improves welfare. In contrast, if the quality gaps
are large, a small increase in the ad valorem tax benets the low-quality rm despite the tax
burden because the tax enhances the competitiveness of the rm with respect to the advertising
competition. In addition, also in this case, the ad valorem tax improves welfare. We also note
that an advertising tax is more likely to benet the rms and consumers than an ad valorem tax,
but the impacts of the policies on social welfare are the same.
Finally, we briey mention the case of a unit tax on production. This scenario can be modeled
by setting the prots of each rm as i = (pi   ci   u)yi  C(si), where u is the amount of unit
tax. We can easily nd from (8) that the unit tax increases the prices of the both brands by the
same amount. Therefore, the unit tax has no impact on advertising competition or the amount
of misinformation. This nding can be conrmed by the fact that sSi , y
S
i , and 
S
i depend only
on (i   j), which is not aected by the unit tax. Therefore, a small unit tax simply transfers
income from consumers to the government and does not aect the advertising competition or
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social welfare at all.
 Partial regulations on misleading advertising. Here we investigate the eect of a
prohibition on misleading advertising as a means of regulating misinformation.
We examined the eect of comprehensive regulations on misleading advertising for both rms
in Section 2.3 by comparing Case O to Case S. Now assume that the government uses \partial"
or \selective" regulations on misleading advertising. In other words, the government prohibits
misleading advertising for only one rm.20 We consider two extreme regulation policies: a policy
that prohibits the high-quality rm from sending any misinformation but that does not restrict
the low-quality rm from advertising and vice versa.
We rst consider a prohibition on sending misinformation that only applies to the high-quality
rm (Firm 1). In this case, the low-quality rm (Firm 2) chooses its s2 to maximize its prots
given s1 = 0. The corresponding equilibrium outcomes are indicated by the superscript PH (i.e.,
prohibition only applies to the high-quality rm). Comparing the equilibrium PH with that in
Cases O and S, we nd that
CSPH  CSO > CSS , (1   2)  15t72kt+ 1 ;
PH < O; WPH < WO:
The derivations are presented in the Appendix. Compared with comprehensive regulations, a par-
tial regulation that only applies the high-quality rm leads to lower industry prots and welfare.
However, if the quality gaps are large, a partial regulation leads to greater aggregate consumer
surplus than comprehensive regulations, as illustrated by Figure 1-(c). This results occurs be-
cause misinformation about the low-quality brand lowers the price of the more heavily consumed
high-quality brand. Furthermore, from (17), we know that CSO > CSS holds for all 1 > 2.
Therefore, if the government's objective is biased towards the consumers' benets, a policymaker
20Advertising regulations often seem to be arbitrary, and the standards in regulations are often criticized for being
ambiguous. For example, regulations that restrict where and how advertising may be done are arbitrary under some
advertising regulations. Therefore, a government agency can accept advertising of a certain type and arbitrarily
reject other advertising of a similar type.
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may prefer to only prohibit misleading advertising by the high-quality rm over prohibiting mis-
leading advertising by both rms or taking no action.
We next consider a partial regulation that only applies to the low-quality rm (Firm 2). In
this case, the high-quality rm (Firm 1) chooses its s1 to maximize its prots given s2 = 0. The
corresponding equilibrium outcomes are indicated by the superscript PL (i.e., prohibition only
applies to the low-quality rm). Comparing the PL equilibrium with that in Cases O and S, we
nd that
CSPL < CSO; WPL < WO;
PL  max[O;S ] , (1   2)  3t(9kt  1)27kt  1 ;
The derivations are presented in the Appendix. Although a partial regulation that only applies to
the low-quality rm leads to lower aggregate consumer surplus and welfare than comprehensive
regulations, a partial regulation may lead to greater industry prots than comprehensive regula-
tions. Furthermore, PL > S holds for all 1 > 2, as shown in the Appendix. Therefore, if the
government's objective is biased towards industry benets, a policymaker may prefer to only pro-
hibit misleading advertising for the low-quality rm instead of prohibiting misleading advertising
for both rms or taking no action.
 Government advertising and policy bias. Next, we consider the government's policies
on the provision of information, such as correcting or endorsing rms' misleading advertising.
Specically, on the one hand, the government can send information that counters the misleading
information provided by rms. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is responsi-
ble for advancing public health by helping to provide the public the accurate, scientically based
information they need to choose medicines and foods to maintain and improve their health. On
the other hand, the government can even send misinformation by certifying and supporting mis-
information provided by rms. For example, in many countries (such as the US, Canada, EU,
and Japan), the standards for organic food productions are formulated and overseen by the gov-
ernment, and the organic food is certied by the government agencies and distributed with labels
conveying that information to consumers. As a result, there appears to be widespread perception
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amongst consumers that such organic foods include higher nutritional quality than conventionally
produced foods.21 However, some studies show that organic food has no nutritional or health ben-
ets over conventionally produced food.22 In this case, the government labels may be considered
to convey false and misleading information to consumers.
As shown in the previous subsection, a government bias toward consumer or industry benets
may drastically change the regulatory framework. We investigate how the government behaves
in response to misinformation about brand qualities and how this response relates to government
bias.
With government information, consumers' utilities (1) are replaced by
U(x) =
8><>: (v1 + 1 (s1; g1))  p1   tx if buys Brand 1(v2 + 2 (s2; g2))  p2   t (1  x) if buys Brand 2;
where i(si; gi) is the amount of misinformation about Brand i, and gi (i = 1; 2) represents
the information provided by the government aimed at aecting the rms' misinformation.23 We
assume the simplest functional form i(si; gi) = si+gi. A positive (negative) value of gi signies a
policy that attempts to validate the rms' misinformation (to limit the eectiveness of the rms'
misinformation).
The equilibrium in the second stage is characterized as
pi (si; sj ; gi; gj) =
(vi   vj) + (i   j)
3
+ ci + t; yi (si; sj ; gi; gj) =
(vi   vj) + (i   j)
6t
+
1
2
:
By using pi and y

i , we obtain the second-stage equilibrium prots 

i and consumer surplus
CS. To ensure that interior solutions are obtained for yi, si, and gi, we assume the following
(but only in this section):
21The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) certies products with the organic label that meet certain
requirements. However, after the organic food standards became eective in October of 2002, USDA Secretary Dan
Glickman claried that organic certication expressed a production philosophy and that organic labeling did not
imply a superior, safer, or healthier product than food not labeled as organic (Winter and Davis 2006).
22See Williams (2001) and Dangour et al. (2009) for the study on a dierence in nutrient quality between organ-
ically and conventionally produced foods.
23Notice that we call gi \information" even though it may actually be misinformation (for example, gi > 0
operates in a manner similar to the misinformation provided by rms).
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Assumption 2. For all i > 0, it holds that 0  (1   2) < ~ 
t (18kt  4+ 3)
6kt+ 1
.
If  = 0, the assumption is reduced to ~ = 3t, which is less restrictive than the condition in
Assumption 1. If  = 1, the assumption may be more restrictive than Assumption 1 because the
government's costs of providing information are separate from those of private rms. Hence, it is
possible to provide greater total amount of (mis)information and to drive the low-quality brand
out of the market.
The objective of the government is dened by
W  = CS + 
2X
i=1
i  
2X
i=1
Cg(gi); (24)
where   1 is the policymaker's subjective weight on industry prots. If  < 1 ( = 1), the
regulator places more weight on consumer surplus than on the industry prots (weight on the
industry prots and consumer surplus equally).24 The advertising cost faced by the government
is Cg(gi). We assume that Cg(gi) = kg2i , which is the same functional form as the cost function
for the private rms.25
In the rst stage, rms and the government respectively respectively choose their amounts
of (mis)information to maximize their own prots and the government's objective, which is rep-
resented by (24). The order of moves between the rms and the government is not crucial for our
results.26
Arranging the rst-order conditions yields the following reaction functions for each rm and
the government (for i = 1; 2; i 6= j):
si =
3t+ i   j
18kt  1  
1
18kt  1 (sj + gj   gi) ; (25)
gi =
(2  1)(i   j)
18kt+ (5  4)  
(5  4)
36kt+ 2(5  4)(si   sj): (26)
24We do not consider a case of  > 1. However, the case can be analyzed as long as  < 5=4.
25We assume that the total costs for providing (mis)information on Brand i incurred by rm i and the government
are C(si) + C(gi) instead of C(si + gi). The assumption can be justied on the grounds that consumers are much
more likely to believe information from multiple sources.
26When we consider a case where the rms choose their levels of misinformation rst before the government
chooses its amount of information, the results do not change qualitatively.
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The second-order conditions are satised under Assumption 1.27 Notice that the strategic in-
teraction between the rms and the government is asymmetric: Firm i will increase si if the
government increases gi, but the government will decrease gi if Firm i increases si.28
Solving (25) and (26) yields the subgame-perfect equilibrium value of si, gi, and i:
sGi =
(6kt+ 1) (i   j)
6kt (18kt  4+ 3) +
1
6k
 0; (27)
gGi =
f6kt (2  1)  1g (i   j)
6kt (18kt  4+ 3) R 0; (28)
Gi =
2 (i   j)
18kt  4+ 3 +
1
6k
R 0; (29)
pGi =
6kt+ 1
18kt  4+ 3(i   j) + ci + t; (30)
yGi =
1
2
+
6kt+ 1
2t(18kt  4+ 3)(i   j); (31)
where the superscript G indicates an equilibrium variable in a case with government advertising.29
Note that if 6kt < (>) (2   1), the equilibrium share of Brand 1, which is represented by (31),
is greater (smaller) than x^E and the equilibrium marginal consumer is located on the right (left)
side of Point E in Figure 3.
We nd that if quality gaps are absent (1 = 2), the government does not have an incentive
to send information (gGi = 0), which holds irrespective of the value of . Conversely, if quality gaps
are present (1 6= 2), the amount and type of information provided by the government depends on
the government's type (i.e., the value of ). Consider rst the case of  = 1, the neutral government
case. In this case, we have gG1 > 0 and g
G
2 < 0 for 6kt > 1 (i.e., the equilibrium marginal consumer
is located on the left of point x^E), which implies that the government has an incentive to conrm
Firm 1's misinformation and negate Firm 2's misinformation. The result may seem to contradict
the previous nding that advertising competition yields socially excessive misinformation (see
27In detail, the second-order conditions of the government's maximization are
@2W 
@g2i
=  2k   5  4
18t
< 0;
@2W 
@gi@gj
=
5  4
18t
> 0;
@2W 
@g2i
 @
2W 
@g2j

 

@2W 
@gi@gj
2
= 4k2 +
2k(5  4)
9t
> 0:
Therefore,  < 5=4 is sucient for the second-order conditions to hold.
28As before, the rms choices regarding the amount of misinformation are strategic substitutes.
29The sign condition of sGi  0 8i = 1; 2 comes from Assumption 2.
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Section 2.4), but the result is reasonable. Because the costs of providing (mis)information for
the rms and the government are separable, a certain amount of misinformation can be provided
at a lower cost in a case with government advertising than in a case without it. Therefore,
from sSB1 > 0, we nd that if  = 1, the government sends positive information (or certies the
misinformation provided by the high-quality rm). However, gG1 > 0, at the same time, makes the
high-quality rm send more misinformation because gG1 raises the market share of the high-quality
brand, which increases the marginal benets of sending misinformation for the high-quality rm.30
However, if  = 1 and 6kt < 1, then gG1 < 0 and g
G
2 > 0 holds in equilibrium. This result occurs
because if k and/or t are small (i.e., advertising competition is erce), the amount of Firm 1's
misinformation is so large that the equilibrium marginal consumer will be located on the right of
point x^E , which ensures the maximum welfare gain.
Next, consider a case of  = 0, the case of an extremely consumerist policymaker. In equi-
librium, we have gG1 < 0 and g
G
2 > 0: the government provides counter-information against the
high-quality brand and positive information regarding the low-quality brand. This policy lowers
(raises) the price of the high-quality (low-quality) brand and increases the aggregate consumer
surplus.
In addition, we nd an interesting relationship between the degree of government bias and
the information provided by the rms and the government. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship
between the amounts of (mis)information provided by the rms and the government in a case
where brand quality is unequal (1 > 2). The left panel of the gure illustrates a case with a
large k and/or t such that 6kt > (2 1), whereas the right panel illustrates a case with a small k
and/or t such that 6kt < (2  1). We can conrm the results from the gure. Specically, from
(28), we nd that gG1 < 0 and g
G
2 > 0 hold if
 <   6kt+ 1
12kt
;
where  is necessarily greater than 1=2. We nd that if the policymaker's bias is smaller than ,
30This can be conrmed by the strategic relationship between g1 and s1, dsi=dgi > 0, as shown in (25).
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then he/she attempts to negate Firm 1's misinformation and conrm Firm 2's misinformation.
By doing so, the consumerist policymaker can lower the price of the more purchased high-quality
brand and thereby make consumers better o.
4 Nave and Smart Consumers
Thus far, we have considered a situation where all of the consumers are nave enough that they
always believe the misinformation about the brand qualities. In this section, we extend the model
by considering smart consumers who can identify the true quality of the brand without being
inuenced by misinformation.
Suppose there is a proportion  2 [0; 1] of nave consumers and a proportion (1  ) of smart
consumers at each point on the x 2 [0; 1] line. The total number of consumers is unity that is the
same as before. Because the smart consumers can identify the true quality of the brands when
making purchases, their perceived and ex-post utilities are indierent and are dened by
Usm(x) =
8><>: v1   p1   tx if buys Brand 1v2   p2   t (1  x) if buys Brand 2:
The subscript sm indicates the variables for the smart consumers. The perceived utility of the
nave consumers Una(x) is the same as in (1).
The marginal nave and smart consumers (x^na and x^sm), who are indierent between choosing
Brands 1 and 2 are respectively given by
x^na =
(v1 + s1)  (v2 + s2)  (p1   p2)
2t
+
1
2
; x^sm =
v1   v2   (p1   p2)
2t
+
1
2
: (32)
Therefore, the demand for Brands 1 and 2 are y1 = x^na+ (1  )x^sm and y2 = (1  x^na) + (1 
)(1  x^sm), respectively. The second-stage equilibrium prices and outputs can be obtained by
pi (si; sj ; ) =
(i   j) + (si   sj)
3
+ ci + t; yi (si; sj ; ) =
(i   j) + (si   sj)
3t
+
1
2
:
Substituting pi into (32), we have
x^na =
(1   2) + (3  2)(s1   s2)
6t
+
1
2
; x^sm =
(1   2)  2(s1   s2)
6t
+
1
2
:
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Interestingly, x^na is increasing in s1, but x^sm is decreasing in s1.
The aggregate consumer surplus for consumer k (k =nave, smart) is given by
CSk =
Z x^k
0
[v1   tx  p1]dx+
Z 1
x^k
[v2   t(1  x)  p2]dx:
The eect of exogenous changes in misinformation on the nave and smart consumers' consumer
surpluses are respectively given by
dCSna
dsi
=
dx^na
dsi
f(v1   tx^na   p1)  (v2   t(1  x^na)  p2)g| {z }
mischoice eect 6= 0
+
Z x^na
0

 @p

1
@si

dx+
Z 1
x^na

 @p

2
@si

dx| {z }
price change eects
=  (3  2)(si   sj)
6t
  f(i   j) + (3  2)(si   sj))g
9t
;
dCSsm
dsi
=
dx^sm
dsi
f(v1   tx^sm   p1)  (v2   t(1  x^sm)  p2)g| {z }
mischoice eect = 0
+
Z x^sm
0

 @p

1
@si

dx+
Z 1
x^sm

 @p

2
@si

dx| {z }
price change eects
=
 f (i   j) + 2(si   sj)g
9t
:
Because the smart consumers are never misled by misinformation, the mischoice eect of misin-
formation becomes zero for any value of si. Therefore, the smart consumers are only aected by
misinformation through price-change eects. We also nd that when evaluated at s1 = s2, an
increase in misinformation about the high-quality (low-quality) brand always lowers (raises) the
aggregate consumer surplus of the smart consumers.
Figure 5 illustrates the eect of an exogenous change in misinformation about the high-quality
brand (Brand 1) and the responses by the nave and smart consumers in cases of equal quality
(the left panel) and unequal quality (the right panel). In the left panel of the gure, providing
misinformation about the high-quality brand raises Brand 1's price but lowers Brand 2's price.
As before, the marginal nave consumer moves to the right (from x^O to x^+na). However, the
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marginal smart consumer moves to the left (from x^O to x^+sm) because he/she precisely assesses
Brand 1's quality. The change in the consumer surplus of nave consumers is represented by area
 B C D E+H (the mischoice eect is  B E and the price-change eect is  C D+H),
whereas the change in the smart consurmers' surplus is represented by  A C + F +G+H. In
this case, the former is negative, but the latter is positive. In total, ( B   C  D   E +H) +
(1 )( A C+F +G+H) represents the change in the aggregate consumer surplus. Regarding
the individual consumer surplus, the smart consumers who are located at [0; x^+sm] lose because
of the misinformation, whereas those at [x^O; 1] gain. In contrast, the nave consumers who are
located at [0; x^+na] lose and those who at [x^
+
na; 1] gains from the misinformation. The industry
prots are changed by (C+D+E H)+(1  )(C F  G H). Therefore, the welfare change
is simply given by  B   (1   )A. In the right panel of Figure 5, the misinformation about
Brand 1 (v1 to v+1 ) changes the consumer surplus of the smart consumers by  A C+F +G+H
and that of the nave consumers by B   C   D   E + H. The industry prots are changed by
(C +D + E  H) + (1  )(C   F  G H). Therefore, the welfare change is simply given by
B   (1  )A.
In the following, we investigate the endogenous misinformation produced by the advertising
competition between rms. To ensure that interior solutions are obtained for yi and si, we slightly
modify Assumption 1 as follows.
Assumption 3. For all i > 0, it holds that 0  (1   2) 
9kt  2
3k
.
Deriving the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the same manner as in Section 2.3, we nd the
following equilibrium values of misinformation, prices, and outputs:
sMi = 

i   j
2 (9kt  2) +
1
6k

; pMi =
3kt(i   j)
9kt  2 + ci + t; y
M
i =
3k(1   2)
2 (9kt  2) +
1
2
;
where the superscript M refers to an equilibrium variable in this case (i.e., nave and smart
consumers coexist in the economy). Obviously, sMi = s
S
i and p
M
i = p
S
i hold if  = 1, and
sMi = 0 and p
M
i = p
O
i hold if  = 0. We nd that dp
M
1 =d  0 (dpM2 =d  0) and dyM1 =d  0
(dyM2 =d  0), which suggests that the price and consumption of the high-quality (low-quality)
brand increases (decreases) as the proportion of nave consumers increases. This relationship
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exists because an increase in the proportion of nave consumers spurs advertising competition
between the rms, which gives the high-quality (low-quality) rm a superior (inferior) position in
the subsequent price competition. Because the smart consumers know that the high price of the
high-quality brand is partly attributed to the behavior of the nave consumers, who are deceived
by misinformation, the price and market share of the the high-quality brand is more likely to
decrease as more consumers become smart shoppers.
The equilibrium prots, the consumer surpluses for the nave and smart consumers, and the
welfare can be derived as follows.
Mi =
 
18kt  2 3k (3t+ i   j)  22
36k (9kt  2)2 ; (33)
CSMsm =
(1  )  3kt  22
4t (9kt  2)2 (1   2)
2 +
(1  )(1 + 2)
2
  5t(1  )
4
; (34)
CSMna =

 
3kt     2  3kt+    2
4t (9kt  2)2 (1   2)
2 +
 (1 + 2)
2
  5t
4
; (35)
WM = CSMna + (1  )CSMsm +
2X
i=1
Mi
=
kt
 
45kt  82  3(1  )
4t (9kt  2)2 (1   2)
2 +
1 + 2
2
  
2
18k
  1
4
t: (36)
First, we compare the consumer surplus of the nave and smart consumers with that of the
consumers in Case O. We obtain
CSMsm   CSO =  
2
 
9kt  22
9t (9kt  2)2 (1   2) R 0 , 9kt Q 2
2;
CSMna   CSO =  
2

36kt+
 
9  82	
36t (9kt  2)2 (1   2)  0:
The smart consumers, on average, gain (lose) from advertising competition if the proportion of
nave consumers is large (small) and the advertising costs are small (large), whereas the nave
consumers are always made worse o. However, the aggregate consumer surplus for all consumers
CSM  CSMna+(1 )CSMsm is necessarily smaller than CSO. Therefore, advertising competition
reduces the aggregate consumer surplus even if there are some smart consumers in the economy.
Second, we investigate the eect of a decrease in the proportion of nave consumers on the
equilibrium outcomes. Here, the eect of a decrease in  can be considered as a government policy
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that educates consumers. Dierentiating (33) in  yields the following:
dM1
d
=   
18k
+
3kt
(9kt  2)2 (1   2) +
k
 
27kt  2
2 (9kt  2)3 (1   2)
2; (37)
dM2
d
=   
18k
  3kt
(9kt  2)2 (1   2) +
k
 
27kt  2
2 (9kt  2)3 (1   2)
2  0; (38)
The prots of the low-quality rm are a decreasing function of  because an increase in  leads
to greater advertising competition, which decreases the price and consumption of the low-quality
brand. However, the eect of an increase in  on the prots of the high-quality rm is ambiguous.
An increase in  induces more advertising competition that is unnecessary and costly. However, if
the quality gaps are large, this increase also gives a competitive advantage in advertising and price
competition to the high-quality rm. Therefore, the greater the quality gaps are, the more likely
that an increase in the proportion of nave consumers benets the high-quality rm.31 However,
if there are no quality gaps (1 = 2), we have dMi =d =  =(18k) < 0 for both i = 1; 2 from
(37) and (38), which indicates that an increase in the proportion of nave consumers reduces both
rms' prots due to the unprotable advertising competition.
Next, dierentiating the aggregate consumer surplus (CSM ) in  yields
dCSM
d
=  

3kt (24kt+ (9  8)) + 3	
4t (9kt  2)3 (1   2)
2  0;
which implies that an increase in the proportion of nave consumers reduces aggregate consumer
surplus. The nave consumers suer disutility from the mischoices that are directly induced by
increased misinformation. Despite having never been misguided by misinformation, the smart
consumers also indirectly suer disutility from price changes (i.e., the increase (decrease) in the
price of the more (less) heavily consumed Brand 1 (Brand 2)).
Finally, dierentiating WM in  yields
dWM
d
=   
9k
  
 
36k2t2   27kt + 20kt2   3
4t (9kt  2)3 (1   2)
2  0:
31In detail, M1 is an increasing function of  if
(1   2) >
 
9kt  22
3k (27kt  2) :
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The sign condition is from Assumption 3.32 Therefore, an increase in the proportion of nave
consumers always reduces social welfare.
The results can be summarized as follows. A policy of educating consumers (to reduce ) does
not aect the consumers but benets both rms if there are no quality gaps between the brands. If
there are some quality gaps between the brands, the policy improves aggregate consumer surplus,
the prots of the low-quality rm, and welfare. However, the policy may reduce the prots of the
high-quality rm. In addition, because the eect of the policy on individual consumer surpluses
is diverse, the policy may have diculty obtaining enough political support.33
5 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate misleading advertising competition in a Hotelling model where two
rms compete for market share. Although misinformation makes some consumers worse o, a
certain amount of misinformation may improve social welfare by removing the ineciency due
to the misallocation of products, even if the misinformation does not increase total consumption.
We show that the quality gaps between the brands play a crucial role in determining the eect
of misinformation on the rms' prots, the aggregate and individual consumer surpluses, and
32From Assumption 3, the maximum dierence between (1   2) is (9kt  2)=(3k). Thus, we derive
dWM
d
 dW
M
d

(1 2)= 9kt 
2
3k
=  
2

3kt (9  8) + 2	
36k2t (9kt  2)  0;
which implies that dWM=d  0 always holds.
33It is interesting to compare our results with those of Hattori and Higashida (2012), who show that an increase
in the proportion of nave consumers necessarily increases the prots of the rms that provide misinformation
about their product qualities and may improve social welfare. The dierence between our ndings and their results
depends on the types of the advertising and whether misinformation can expand market size. In their model, rms
engage in \generic" advertising, which sends misinformation about the product category. Hence, there are some
positive advertising externalities among the rms. In addition, in their study, the misinformation provided by the
rms can expand the total market size (i.e., total consumption), which mitigates the underprovision of goods that
results from oligopolistic competition. In contrast, in our study, each rm advertises its own product to capture its
rival rm's market share, and the total market size is xed. Thus, there is no eciency gain from the increase in
misinformation caused by an increase in the proportion of nave consumers.
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welfare.
The main contribution of this article is to determine who benets and who loses from misin-
formation due to misleading advertising competition between rms and related regulations. We
use simple analytical and graphical analyses. First, we show that the amount of misinformation
endogenously produced by misleading advertising competition is excessive from a welfare perspec-
tive. If there are no quality gaps between the brands, advertising competition harms both rms
but does not aect consumers. However, if there are certain quality gaps between the brands, ad-
vertising competition benets the high-quality rm and the consumers who prefer the low-quality
brand.
We also investigate the eects of several regulatory policies. Both advertising and ad valorem
taxes reduce the degree of advertising competition between the brands and have the same impact
on the degree of advertising competition and social welfare. However, these taxes dier in the
distributional impacts on consumers and rms. We also show that bias in the policymaker's
objective plays a crucial role in the prohibition of misinformation and the government's provision
of information. In particular, a consumerist policymaker may prefer to regulate misinformation
about the high-quality brand, but he/she may overlook or even certify misinformation about the
low-quality brand.
Finally, we extend the basic model by considering a case with heterogeneous consumers (i.e.,
nave and smart consumers) to investigate how misleading advertising competition between brands
aects the consumers' utilities and the rms' prots. Advertising competition necessarily reduces
the utility of nave consumers but may improve the utility of smart consumers on average. We
also show that if the quality gaps between the brands are small, a small decrease in the proportion
of nave consumers will be Pareto-improving by weakening the incentive to engage in unprotable
advertising competition. Therefore, in this case, a government policy of educating consumers
works well.
Appendix
 In the Appendix section, for notational convenience, we dene   (1   2)  0.
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 Equilibrium under advertising taxes
The equilibrium prots of each rm, the aggregate consumer surplus, and welfare can be obtained as
follows:
a1 =
18kt(1 + a)  1
36k(1 + a)
+
18kt(1 + a)  1
6 f9kt(1 + a)  1g +
k(1 + a) f18kt(1 + a)  1g
4 f9kt(1 + a)  1g2
2;
a2 =
18kt(1 + a)  1
36k(1 + a)
  18kt(1 + a)  1
6 f9kt(1 + a)  1g +
k(1 + a) f18kt(1 + a)  1g
4 f9kt(1 + a)  1g2
2;
CSa =
3k(1 + a) f3kt(1 + a)  2g
4 f9kt(1 + a)  1g2
2 +
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t;
and W a = CSa +
P
ai + ak
n
(sa1 )
2 + (sa2 )
2
o
. Thus, dierentiating the above in a at a = 0, we
obtain the comparative static results presented in the main body of the article.
 Equilibrium under ad valorem taxes The equilibrium prots of each rm, the aggregate consumer
surplus, and welfare can be obtained as follows:

p
1 =
(1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
36k
+
(1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
6 f9kt  (1  p)g  +
k(1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
4 f9kt  (1  p)g2
2;

p
2 =
(1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
36k
  (1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
6 f9kt  (1  p)g  +
k(1  p) f18kt  (1  p)g
4 f9kt  (1  p)g2
2;
CSp =
3k f3kt  2(1  p)g
4 f9kt  (1  p)g 
2
  
cp
1  p +
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t;
and W p = CSp +
P

p
i + p
P
p
p
i y
p
i . Thus, dierentiating them in p at p = 0, we obtain the
comparative static results presented in the main body.
 Equilibrium under partial regulation First, we derive the equilibrium outcomes in case PH,
where the government only prohibits the high-quality rm from generating misleading advertising. From
(6) we have sPH1 = 0 and s
PH
2 = (3t )=(18kt  1). Substituting them into  and CS yields
PH =
t(324k2t2   45kt+ 2)
(18kt  1)2  
6kt
(18kt  1)2 +
k(36kt  1)
(18kt  1)2
2

CSPH =
(6k   1) f2(3kt  1) + 5tg
4(18kt  1)2 +
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t;
and WPH = CSPH +PH . Thus, we have
PH  O =   (3t ) f3t(9kt  1) + (27kt  1)g
9t(18kt  1)2 < 0;
CSPH   CSO = (3t ) f(72kt+ 1)   15tg
36t(18kt  1)2 R 0 ,  R
15t
72kt+ 1
;
WPH  WO =   (3t )

(3t ) + 108kt2 + 4(9kt  1)
	
36t(18kt  1)2 < 0:
35
Because CSO  CSS necessarily holds from (17), we have CSPH  CSO > CSS for   (15t)=(72kt+1),
PH < O, and WPH < WO.
Then, we derive the equilibrium outcomes in case PL, where the government implements s2 = 0.
From (6) we have sPL1 = (3t+)=(18kt  1) and sPH2 = 0. Substituting them into  and CS yields
PL =
t(324k2t2   45kt+ 2)
(18kt  1)2 +
6kt
(18kt  1)2 +
k(36kt  1)
(18kt  1)2
2

CSPL =
(6k + 1) f2(3kt  1)   5tg
4(18kt  1)2 +
1 + 2
2
  5
4
t;
and WPL = CSPL +PL. Thus, we have
PL  O = (3t+) f(27kt  1)   3t(9kt  1)g
9t(18kt  1)2 R 0 ,  R
3t(9kt  1)
27kt  1
CSPL   CSO =   (3t+) f15t+ (72kt+ 1)g
36t(18kt  1)2 < 0;
WPL  WO =   (3t+) f + 15t+ 4(9kt  1) (3t ))g
36t(18kt  1)2 < 0:
Furthermore, comparing PL and S , we have
PL  S = (9kt  1  3k)

(9kt  1) + 18kt(9kt  1)2 + 3k [1 + 54(9kt  1)]
	
18k(18kt  1)2(9kt  1)2 > 0;
where the sign comes from Assumption 1. Therefore, we have PL  max[O;S ] when  > f3t(9kt  1)g =(27kt 
1), CSPL < CSO, and WPL < WO.
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FIGURE 1
EXOGENOUS CHANGES IN MISINFORMATION FOR HIGH- OR LOW-QUALITY BRAND
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FIGURE 2
WELFARE EFFECT OF ADVERTISING COMPETITION
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FIGURE 3
THE SECOND-BEST MISINFORMATION
welfare gain E
p1
SB
p1
O
p2
SB
p2
O
0 x`O x`SB x`E 1
c1
v1
v1+s1
SB
c2
v2
v2+s2
SB
Location HxL
39
FIGURE 4
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC (MIS)INFORMATION AND GOVERNMENT BIAS
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FIGURE 5
THE EFFECT OF MISINFORMATION ON NAIVE AND SMART CONSUMERS
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